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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. REID and RONALD P.
NELSON, d/b/a CUSTOM
PROMOTIONS,

1,

..
vs.

NICK M. DODAS and RHODA
DODAS, his wife,
DefeNl,,anta-.4.,,,,,,._,

Appeal from tbe Jdpaent et Tldl'd . . , •
Salt Lake County, State GI . . . .
Honorable Joseph G. Jepp1-. ,.,......

.•111. H. FANKHAUSER
' Jqdge Building
t Lake City, Utah
for DefendantsAppellants.
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IN THE SUPREiviE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOBERT C. REID and RONALD P.
PROMOTIONS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
12913

NICK M. DUDAS and RHODA
DUDAS, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts that are stated in appellants' brief are
disputed by the respondents in the following particulars.
At all times material hereto, the defendants both
contracted with the plaintiffs to perform certain interior
decoration work which included materials and services.
1

Said plaintiffs contracted only for the interior decora.
tion. The parties entered into an oral agreement on or
about August 15, 1964 for said decorating services and
they agreed that the decorating services would not cost
in excess of $3,500,00.
The total indebtedness was the sum of $3,363.75. ln
August of 1964, the plaintiffs were paid the sum of
$600.00. In October of 1964, the plaintiffs were paid an
additional sum of $1,000.00 and the third sum of $150.00
was paid to plaintiffs in April of 1968. Defendants were
indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,613.75. After
completion of said interior decorating, no other work
was done by the plaintiffs in behalf of the defendants.
No work was done by the plaintiffs in 1968 for the defendants.
The plaintiffs continued to send monthly state·
ments after the completion of their work until legal ac·
tion was initiated. Plaintiff Robert C. Reid repeatedly
requested payment; defendants did not deny the obliga·
tion owing until the legal action was initiated.
The plaintiffs filed a certificate of doing business,
under an assumed name, as required by law, on or about
July 28, 1970.
POINT I
JUDGMENT \VAS PROPERLY GRANTED
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS NICK M.
DODAS AND RHODA DODAS, HIS "TIFE.

2

1

1

ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs, on or about August 15, 1964, entered into an oral agreement to perform certain decorating services as requested by the defendants. The defendant Rhoda Dodas gave direction to the plaintiffs
concerning the interior decorating and was present and
took part during most of the conversations that took
place between the parties.
As to all of the important issues of fact in this
matter, there is conflicting testimony by all of the parties. The District Court, sitting without a jury, was able
to observe each witness, hear the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses through direct and cross examination. In determining whether, and to what extent,
witnesses are to be believed, the court may consider appearance and general demeanor and impact of personalities of witnesses, in connection with reactions, manner
of expression, and apparent frankness and candor or
want of it in reacting to and answering questions on both
direct and cross-examination. (See Gittens v. Lundberg,
284 P.2d 3 U 2d 392, 1115.)
The lower court believed the testimony of the plaintiffs rather than the defendants.
The appellants in their brief cite the Utah case of
Alrnrado v. Tucker, 2 U2d 16, 268 P2d 986. In reviewing the facts in this case, we have a case dealing with an
automobile-pedestrian negligence case. In said case,
there was a jury and the court was concerned with the
question of contributory negligence. The facts and Ian-
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guage in said case do not apply to a contract case where
we are dealing with the supplying of certain materiali
an<l decorating services.

1

POINT II
THE LO\VER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTJNG JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED
IN THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DID PROVE
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE MATERIALS FURNISHED AND SERVICES
RENDERED.
ARGUMENT
The lower Court did not err in allowing documents
presented as exhibits by plaintiffs to be admitted since a
proper foundation was layed prior to the offering of
each exhibit.
The plaintiffs d/b/a Custom Promotions worked on
several decorating jobs other than the defendants. On
certain occasions, the plaintiffs would require materials
for not only the defendants' decorating project but for
other jobs. The plaintiff Robert C. Reid testified that
some invoices that he had received for the purchase of
materials included materials for other decorating jobs
other than the defendants' project, but in each instance,
he set forth the materials that were used on the defend·
ants' job and the materials that were used on other
4

1

projects. The plaintiff did meet their burden of proof as
to the reasonable rnlue of the materials furnished and
serrices performed in the sum of $1,613.75.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
THAT THEY DID NOT ACT AS A CONTRACTOR AND WERE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE
A CONTRACTORS LICENSE.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs did not act as a contractor as defined
by Title 58-23-3(3), UCA, 1953, as amended. The
plaintiffs did not bid competitively nor remodel and
construct the restaurant-lounge as stated in Appellant's
Brief.

The Plaintiffs were not acting as a contractor and
were not required to allege that they were licensed contractors as required by Section 58-23-1, UCA, 1953 as
amended.
The statutes and case law cited in Appellants Brief
are true statements of the law, but it does not apply with
the facts we have before us.
Section 58-23-2, UCA, 1953 as amended states
certain exceptions to the act, particularly sub-section
(ti) where it is stated:
5

"Any person engaged in the sale or merchandising
of personal property which by its design or manufacture
may be attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real
property who has contracted with a person, firm or corporation licensed under the provisions of this act to
install, affix or attach the same."
The Plaintiffs did not secure a building permit in
that they were not acting as contractors but were decorating the premises and this required the attaching and '
installing of materials in the defendants restaurant. i
lounge. The Plaintiffs possessed a retail merchants ]i. 1
cense issued by the City of Salt Lake City and a Sales
Tax License issued by the State of Utah.
The Appellants in their brief ref er to the case of }
Nickel v. Walkers, 74 N.1\1. 546, 395 P.2d 679. This
case held that a partnership, not licensed as such by
Contractors License Board, could not bring or maintain
an action for balance allegedly due on contract to con·
struct residence and to enforce mechanics lein, not with·
standing that one partner was licensed and that he in '
good faith had relied on telephone advice from a member
of the board that since other partner would furnish
merely clerical and financial assistance, no license for 1
partnership would be required.
This case has no application to the facts before us
whatsoever.
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS
IN THAT THEIR CLAIM WAS NOT
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs received a payment from the defendants in the amount of $150.00 in April of 1968. The payment tolled the Statute of Limitations (Section 78-1225, UCA, 1953 as amended). There is no dispute in the
facts that the payment was made. The payment was
acknowledged by the plaintiffs and deducted from the
balance owing on the monthly statement that was sent
to the defendants. The defendants claimed the payment
was for a bench but the plaintiffs denied doing any work
for the defendants in 1968.
The lower court once again believed the testimony
of the plaintiffs and not the defendants.
At all times material the plaintiffs were dealing
with the defendants and not a corporation. The corporation was not a joint obligor.
The defendants claim that in June of 1964, defendant Rhoda Dodas was an employee of Mr. Dodas.
They subsequently claim that in October of 1967, the
emploree became the owner. Defendant Rhoda Dodas
entered into the oral contract in August of 1964 and
7

paymeHts were made up until April of 1968. I submit
that Defendant Rhoda Dudas and the
Rhoda's Restaurant are one and the same person. The
lower court pierced the corporate veil.
The Appellants cite the case of Holloway v. Wet.
zel, 86 U 387, 45 P2d 568 in their brief. The rule of law
stated in that case refers to a situation where there were
one of two or more joint and several obligors and part
payment by one of the obligors did not suspend the run·
ning of the statute of limitations against the other co·
obligors. Rhoda's Restaurant, a corporation, was never
a co-obligor. It is further stated in the case that the
statute contemplates the making of payment by the
party himself or by someone authorized by him to toll
the statute.
Certainly the payment made by Rhoda's Restau·
rant, a corporation, in April of 1968 was made by the
authorization of Defendant Rhoda Dodas in that the
Appellants claim she purchased the restaurant from her
husband in October of 1967 and incorporated it.
The Appellants also refer to Upton v. Heisel!
Const. Co. 116 U. 83, 208 P2d 945, but in reviewing this
case the facts and rules of law do not apply with the case
we have before us.
CONCLUSION
Respondents submit their case on the facts in this
case as disclosed by the record and the law applicable to

8

the issues of this case. The judgment rendered in favor
of plaintiffs and against defendants should be affirmed.
Respectfuly submitted,
ALAN D. FRANDSEN
353 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondents

9

